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Introduction 
 
The  question  of  the  status  of  public 
administrations  –  outwardly  a  technical 
one  –  appears  as  an  important  political 
issue  in  the  post-communist  context.  The 
form and place of the State is one of the 
main issues (political and scientific) raised 
by  post-Sovietism
2  in  East  European 
societies. The administration of the former 
regimes, along with the Communist Party, 
has  embodied  the  Soviet  type  of 
centralised  state  control.  It  constitutes  a 
particularly relevant context to evaluate the 
evolution  of  the  form  and  action  of  the 
                                                 
1 This working paper is a translated and updated 
version of an earlier publication: « Européanisation 
et réforme de l’Etat. L’influence de l’Union 
européenne sur la réforme des administrations 
publiques centrales tchèques (1993-2004) », in O. 
Baisnée, R. Pasquier, eds., L’Europe telle qu’elle se 
fait. Européanisation et sociétés politiques 
nationales, Paris, CNRS Editions, 2007,  p.167-
193. Many thanks to Jesse Tatum and Jean-Yves 
Bart for their precious help on the English version. 
2 “Sovietism”  indicates  a  system  based  on  an 
economy  [production,  allotment,  consumption, 
costs] and a society [work and trade unions, culture, 
collective  organisations]  administered  by  a 
centralised bureaucracy and controlled by the ruling 
party. 
State  in  these  new  democracies.  The 
administrations in socialist countries were 
based  on  the  explicit  rejection  of  the 
separation of powers. Administrative staff 
organisation  was  based  on  partisan 
selection and on the management of civil 
servants,  as  well  as  on  the  denial  of  a 
statutory  identity  specific  to  the  civil 
service. The debate on  the status of civil 
servants and services provided by the State 
has  allowed  for  the  redevelopment  of  a 
fundamental  aspect  from  the  former 
system:  partisan  intervention  in  the 
selection  and  management  of  personnel, 
and  consequently,  a  degree  of  political 
autonomy  for  the  administrative  staff. 
More  generally,  the  treatment  of  civil 
servants  is  important  evidence  of  the 
conception of the State that prevails at any 
given moment in history. 
 
Over  the  years,  the  reform  of  public 
administrations has become, among others, 
one  criterion  in  the  evaluation  of  the 
capacity of Central and Eastern European 
countries  (CEEC)  for  EU  integration.  In 
conjunction  with  other  international 
organisations like the OECD or the World 
Bank,  the  European  Commission  and  the 
PHARE  programmes  became  involved  in 
the issue during the negotiations about the 
eastern  enlargement  of  the  European 
Union.  Certainly,  the  organisation  of 
national administrations, in principle, is not 
within the scope of the EU. Nevertheless, 
the  White  Paper  published  in  1995 
regarding the preparation of the candidate 
countries insists on the necessity for these 
countries  to  not  only  harmonise  their 
legislations,  but  also  to  equip  themselves 
with  an  administrative  capacity  to 
implement  the  acquis.  The  latter 
specification potentially covers  almost all 
public domains, as well as the operational  
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rules  of  national  and  regional 
administrations (Grabbe, 2001).
3 
 
Therefore,  it  is  necessary  to  evaluate  the 
EU’s role in the process of reform of the 
central public administrations in the former 
candidate  countries.  To  what  extent  is  it 
possible  to  speak  of  a  progressive 
Europeanisation of the reform of the post-
Soviet State? Moreover, does the European 
Union  promote  an  administrative 
‘standard’  in  these  countries,  and  if  so, 
which one? 
 
Authors  working  on  the  effects  of  the 
accession  process  on  central  public 
administrations, and national executives in 
the  CEECs,  have  drawn  inspiration  from 
the  studies  on  ‘Europeanisation’  in  the 
Member  States  in  order  to  assess  the 
institutional  evolutions  caused  by  EU 
candidacy  (Goetz,  2000:  212).  There  can 
be  direct  effects  when  they  are  binding 
(e.g. the power of injunction), or indirect in 
the case of the spillover effects from EU 
structures  or  administrative  practices  at 
national level (e.g. the power of influence) 
(Radaelli,  2000:  8).  Administrative 
Europeanisation  in  the  Member  States 
tends  to  ensure  the  predominance  of 
executive power, as well as the legislative 
power of senior officials who specialise in 
European  issues,  which  reinforces  the 
technical  nature  of  public  policies.  After 
the  beginning  of  the  accession 
negotiations, the CEECs have experienced 
a  similar  trend:  first  of  all,  national 
executives were favoured in the accession 
process to the detriment of parliaments and 
regional  representatives.  Secondly, 
administrations  tended  to  create  highly 
trained teams that focused on the specific 
qualifications  expected  for  the 
management of European issues. Given the 
lack  of  equivalent  resources  within  the 
                                                 
3  Certain  European  actors,  especially  the 
Commission,  have particularly benefited  from the 
opportunity  afforded  by  eastern  enlargement  to 
extend their prerogatives (Robert, 2001). 
elected assemblies, the process of adopting 
the  legislation  of  the  acquis 
communautaire  has  tended  to  be 
dominated  by  the  executive  power.
4  In 
essence, the spillover effects were induced 
by the negotiation process itself and can be 
thought  of  in  terms  of  adaptation  though 
anticipation.
5 
 
Nevertheless,  the  institutional  use  of  the 
notion  of  Europeanisation,  in  this  case, 
does not seem to suffice. In restricting their 
analysis  to  the  institutional  issue,  the 
majority of these studies fail to take into 
account  one  fundamental  aspect  of 
influence that the EU exerts in the CEECs. 
In  the  Eastern  European  context, 
‘Europeanisation’  does  not  necessarily 
mean  ‘EU-Europeanisation’  or 
‘Unionisation’ (Wallace & Wallace, 2000). 
Instead,  the  historical  relationship  with 
Europe  that  predates  the  beginning  of 
accession  negotiations  should  be  fully 
taken  into  account.  The  discourse  of  ‘a 
return  to  Europe’,  significant  since  1989, 
identifies  several  models  of  reference 
whose virtues are emphasised by national 
actors  as  ingredients  for  the  transition  to 
democracy  and  to  a  market  economy.  In 
this context, the EU is one reference in a 
political and social transformation process 
in  which  political  cleavages  and  social 
conflicts  develop.  In  other  words,  it  is 
equally in terms of values and strategies of 
re-appropriation of a (or rather of several) 
general  reference  model(s),  or  of  models 
created  by  some  Member  States  (Great 
Britain, Germany) or non-members of the 
EU  (United  States),  that  the 
Europeanisation  of  the  CEECs  is 
concretely  conceptualised  and  practiced 
                                                 
4 These reports have led a group of researchers to 
the  conclusion  that  one  effect  of  eastern 
enlargement  may  be  the  exportation  of  the  EU’s 
democratic deficit to these young democracies. See, 
Special issue, Journal of European Public Policy, 
2001, 8 (6). 
5  This  process  of  executive  re-centralisation  can 
also  be  seen  in  the  field  of  regional  policy 
(Aïssaoui, 2005).  
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often  more  in  terms  of  ‘Westernisation’ 
than of ‘Europeanisation’.
6 
   
Europeanisation  is  dependent  on  the 
internal  political  context  of  the  candidate 
countries. Likewise, the external authority 
of  the  European  Commission  on 
administrations has caused variable effects 
in  Central  Europe,  because  the 
construction  of  this  public  problem 
occurred in different periods and according 
to  different  modalities.  In  Poland  and 
Hungary,  countries  that  could  rely  on 
previous debates  and nascent institutional 
reforms,  priority  was  quickly  given  to  a 
complete overhaul of the system, aiming to 
build  an  impartial  and  professional 
administration.  In  the  former 
Czechoslovakia, the problem was initially 
approached  in  terms  of  the  political 
purification of administrative personnel. In 
1992 and 1997 respectively, Hungary and 
Poland  adopted  specific  laws  at  a  time 
when  the  subject  was  neglected  by  the 
media and public authorities in the Czech 
Lands.  Whereas  the  Czech  political  and 
social actors were precociously involved in 
the problem of the ‘de-communisation’ of 
administrations, during the 1990s, the role 
and  the  organisation  of  the  Central 
Government remained a neglected subject. 
This  de-communisation  allowed  the 
problem  to  emerge  in  a  scandalous  light, 
which in turn triggered the emergence of 
the  issue  as  a  public  problem. 
Nevertheless, the negative consequence of 
this triggering event was that it shifted the 
focus  of  the  entire  public  debate  to  the 
question  of  political  purification;  while 
masking  the  serious  problems  of 
performance,  training  and  autonomy  that 
plague current post-Soviet administrations 
(Hadjiisky,  2004).  The  Czech  Republic 
only adopted a Civil Service Law
7 in May 
                                                 
6  This  point  directly  links  to  Lippert’s  (et  al.) 
criticism of K.H. Goetz (Lippert, 2001). 
7 Commonly named “state service act” (“zakon o 
statni  sluzbe),  this  law  details  the  status,  the 
recruitment, promotion and payment conditions, the 
2002, following the complicated processes 
of agenda-setting and drafting. 
   
To  give  an  account  of  the  role  of  the 
accession negotiations in this process, it is 
essential to elaborate on the wide range of 
actors in interaction (institutional and non-
institutional),  as  well  as  on  specific 
historical and social contexts that construct 
these  interactions  (Neumayer,  2002).  The 
‘models’ only function as long as they are 
considered  legitimate  and/or  strategically 
useful  to  the  social  actors  involved  in 
defining  what  a  State  should  be  and 
represent. While remaining sensitive to the 
importance  of  social  and  historical 
representations attached to the institutions, 
it is necessary to pay particular attention to 
the  discourses  and  the  modes  of  explicit 
and  implicit  legitimisation  or 
stigmatisation  to  which  the  ‘State’  has 
been subject during the process of reform. 
 
 
I - The complicated agenda-setting 
of the central public 
administration reform. 
 
 
The current state of affairs in post-
Soviet central administrations 
 
In order to understand the functioning of 
central  administrations  after  the  end  of 
Sovietism,  we  first  need  to  assess  the 
actual  sociological  legacy  of  the  central 
Soviet  administration.  In  this  field, 
executive inertia has produced a result that 
is  much  closer  to  the  ‘liberal’ 
administrative  model  than  would  be 
expected  from  the  image  of  the  former 
Soviet bureaucracy. The Party-State, while 
                                                                       
rights  and  duties  of  the  civil  servants  and  some 
sides  of  the  general  organisation  of  the  central 
administrations. So we have chosen to translate its 
heading  by  “Civil  Service  Act”,  the  term  “public 
service” being able to lend to a not very relevant 
confusion  between  the  French  and  the  Czech 
situations.  
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officially  relying  on  a  strict  hierarchical 
subordination  and  on  a  centralised  and 
unified  system,  produced  a  weak  and 
fragmented  administrative  regime, 
removed from the image with which it is 
usually associated
8.  
 
The  soviet  Administration  of  the  1980s 
was  de  facto  characterised  by  two  main 
features: the statutory weakness of its civil 
servants  and  the  prevalence  of  sectoral 
social logics over the coherence of central 
institutions. 
 
This  statutory  weakness  of  the  civil 
servants was one of the components of the 
power  strategy  of  Soviet-type 
governments.  Privileged  insofar  as 
belonging  to  the  nomenklatura,  civil 
servants could not, however,  exercise the 
rights or duties provided by the law.
9 One 
of  the  characteristics  of  Soviet  public 
administrations was the lack of a specific 
law on the civil service and its employees 
(Verheijen, 1999: 3). There was no specific 
legal  status  for  civil  servants  that  could 
have  secured  their  political  independence 
and their recruitment based on merit. 
 
The  prevalence  of  sectoral  logics  was 
neither  expected  nor  desired  during  the 
establishment  of  Soviet  regimes.  It 
gradually  came  into  being  after  de-
Stalinisation.  Due  to  the  influence  of  the 
social  sectors  over  state  and  partisan 
structures,  which  were  expected  to  direct 
them, the Soviet State became, in its final 
historical  period,  the  least  autonomous 
sphere in state socialism (Stark & Bruszt, 
1998). Ministerial departments were more 
closely linked to the social sectors – whose 
management was their responsibility – than 
with  the  other  departments  in  the  central 
                                                 
8 For a stimulating study about the so-called “State 
bureaucracy” and its real functioning during the 
Soviet period, see Dubois, Lozac’h, Rowell (2005). 
9 There was one exception to that rule: members of 
the  security  forces  were  protected  by  a  specific 
piece of legislation. 
government.  Therefore,  the  Soviet 
Administration  operated  in  a  fragmented 
manner,  divided  into  sectors.  Inter-
ministerial  relationships  were 
compartmentalised  and  there  was  little 
staff turnover. In the 1970s and 1980s, the 
system  ended  up  relying  on  the 
considerable power left to the directors of 
different public institutions to manage their 
respective sectors. 
 
As  the  disciplinary  and  nomenklatura 
departments  were  removed,  the  post-
communist  Czech  administration  became 
the  by-product  of  this  de-specified  and 
sectorised post-Soviet administration. This 
is not the result of a series of reforms, but 
the  legacy  of  the  post-Soviet  system. 
However, in practice, the heritage of this 
communist administration tends to favour a 
“substitute  of  the  Anglo-Saxon  model”, 
which  limits  the  specificity  of  the  civil 
service  and  resorts  to  flexible  solutions, 
similar  to  the  methods  of  private 
management  (Kessler,  1996:  16). 
Nevertheless,  contrary  to  the  so-called 
‘liberal’ system, wages remain unattractive 
and  the  qualification  of  civil  servants 
generally insufficient.  
 
Before  the  enactment  of  the  new  public 
administration law on 1
 January 2004, the 
status of civil servants
10 was still governed 
by the General Labour Code. There was no 
centralised  institution  responsible  for  a 
staff policy or for training  candidates for 
jobs  in  public  administration.  The 
recruitment  and  working  conditions  were 
not  uniform:  concretely,  there  were  no 
common  rules  about  the  selection, 
                                                 
10  There  are  14  ministerial  departments  and  8 
administrative state bodies in the Czech Republic. 
In  1998,  these  bodies  employed  just  over  13,500 
people.  In  total,  the  central  public  administration 
(including de-centralised administrations) employs 
over 130,000 people (final report from the Popular 
Education  Fund  for  the  Improvement  of  Public 
Administration, 1998).  
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recruitment,  training  or  remuneration  of 
employees. 
   
In addition, Czech central administrations 
are  characterised  by  a  ‘sectorised’ 
management  and  by  specialised  working 
methods for each department; vestiges of 
the  sectoral  procedural  methods  of  the 
former  system.  Difficulties  in 
communication  and  co-operation  between 
departments are constant (Drulak, 2002), to 
such an extent that they caused the creation 
of  a  frequently  used  neologism, 
resortismus,  composed  from  the  term, 
resort,  which  in  Czech  means, 
“administrative department”.  
 
As they are under-qualified, underpaid, and 
lacking in initiative, civil servants are often 
easily  corruptible.  They  depend  on  the 
political  backing  of  the  government  for 
their  recruitment  and  career.  The  Czech 
jurist  Taisia  Cebisova
11  calls  to  attention 
the concentration of discretionary power in 
the hands of the heads of departments. This 
phenomenon  explains  why  subordinate 
employees  often  seek  to  obtain  partisan 
patronage to ensure their recruitment, their 
promotion  and  the  level  of  their 
premiums.
12  
 
 
                                                 
11  T.  Cebisová,  “Zakon  o  statni  sluzbe.  Jaky  a 
proc?”  [Civil  Service  Act.  Which  law  and  why?] 
Parlamentni Zpravodaj, 02/2000, pp. 4-5. 
12 Jirina Novakova, senior official responsible for 
the  control  of  the  administration,  gives  a  harsh 
review  of  the  central  public  administrations.  She 
criticizes the “lack of unity in the organisation and 
work  relationships”  and  the  insufficient 
professional  training.  Moreover,  she  notes  that, 
given  the  lack  of  human  and  organisational 
resources,  public  bodies  delegate  some  important 
parts of their allocations (including drafting bills) to 
private agencies. Finally, she says that to improve 
the  efficiency  of  the  service  it  is  necessary  “to 
decrease the political dependence of the employees 
and  to  reach  a  certain  degree  of  employment 
stability”. “Nekolik uvah nad navrvhem sluzebniho 
zakona”  [reflections  on  the  Civil  Service  Bill], 
Intergrace 8/2001, p. 2. 
Reasons for a lasting reluctance 
 
Nevertheless,  public  authorities  continued 
to  neglect  the  subject  of  central 
administrations during the initial years of 
Czech  independence  (1  January  1993)  to 
the point of labelling their disregard as a 
‘strategy of non reform’ (Hadjiisky, 2004). 
  
The  first  public  administration  bill  was 
developed from 1993-1994. It responded to 
the internal legal obligation imposed by the 
Constitution,  effective  1  January  1993, 
which  stated  that  the  central 
administration, its individual bodies and its 
staff  should  be  governed  by  law.
13  The 
authors  of  the  1993  Constitution  referred 
several times to the 1920 Constitution. In 
the administrative field, this continuity was 
marked  by  the  statement  in  the 
Constitution on the status of public law in 
central administrations. As in other fields, 
this restoring logic did not last after 1989. 
The contemporary Czech political class is 
divided on the role of the State in the new 
democracy,  and  on  the  nature  of  the 
democracy constructed by the government 
(Hadjiisky,  2001).  Hence,  a  partial  and 
varied  reading  of  the  constitutional  text, 
produces  some  lasting  conflicts  on 
important points, such as the creation of a 
Senate,  regional  de-centralisation,  an 
ombudsman,  and  the  status  of  state 
employees. The Public Administration Bill 
has  been  defended  in  the  Chamber  of 
Deputies  by  Jan  Kalvoda,  vice  prime 
minister in charge of legislation and civil 
service, who was not a member of the ODS 
(Civic Democratic Party), but of the small 
ODA party (Civic Democratic Alliance).
14 
                                                 
13 Article 79 of the  Czech  Republic Constitution, 
adopted  on  the  16  December  1992,  states: 
“Ministries  and  other  administrative  agencies  and 
their jurisdiction may be established only by law”; 
and that, “the legal status of government employees 
in ministries and other administrative agencies shall 
be defined by law.” 
14  There  were  14  deputies  out  of  200  in  the 
Chamber  of  Deputies  of  the  Civic  Democratic 
Alliance  (ODA).  It  was  the  smallest  party  of  the  
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This  bill  was  never  considered  to  be  a 
priority;  it  was  rejected  during  the  first 
reading
15 and the reform was never placed 
on the agenda again.  
 
There was no specific pressure – i.e. from 
academia, the media, or trade unions – on 
the  governments  to  prioritise  central 
administrations reform. 
   
The  main  trade  union  for  employees  in 
public administration did not campaign for 
the  adoption  of  a  specific  status  for  its 
members. During the negotiations, it was 
primarily  concerned  about ensuring  equal 
social  and  trade  union  rights  for  civil 
servants guaranteed by the Labour Code.
16 
This position most likely reflected the fears 
of its members in the face of anticipated 
staff changes, or even those of the heads of 
departments  concerned  with  safeguarding 
their  unrestricted  control  to  manage  the 
services and employees. 
 
Additionally,  some  political  and  social 
interests  hindered,  in  a  discreet  but 
efficient  manner,  a  public  law  status 
concerning  government  employees  from 
                                                                       
coalition government. It joined with the ODS-KDS 
(76 deputies) and the Christian Democratic Union 
(KDU-CSL: 15 deputies). 
15  This  bill  was  rejected  on  the  grounds  that  the 
indications  aiming  to  improve  the  quality  of  the 
services were not sufficient. Moreover, one could 
argue that the approval of the law might have been 
an obstacle for the reorganisation and the renewal 
of the administration. In particular, the text did not 
provide  for  a  period  of  transition,  which,  in 
practical  terms,  involved  the  quasi-automatic 
renewal of the staff in place, without any training 
course or supplementary exams. Finally, additional 
expenditures  (e.g.  wages  and  pensions)  had  been 
neither calculated nor incorporated into the budget 
forecasts. 
16 The president of the Trade Union Confederation 
of  Public  Organisations,  Alena  Vondrova,  often 
voiced strong concerns regarding the law. See: A. 
Vondrova,  “Zakon  o  statni  sluzbe  dostatecne 
nesleduie  moderni  evropske  trendy”  [the  Civil 
Service  Act  does  not  follow  modern  European 
trends  in  a  satisfactory  way],  Parlamentni 
Zpravodaj, 4/2001, p.1. 
being  put  on  the  agenda.  Ambivalence 
towards  the  independence  of  the 
administration is visible within the political 
parties.  The  system  inherited  from 
Sovietism left substantial room for political 
parties to interfere in the management of 
administrative staff. During the 1990s, the 
absence of a standard law, combined with 
strong  ministerial  autonomy,  favoured  a 
gradual  ‘partisanisation’  of  public 
administrations. 
 
 
The European Commission’s role in the 
emergence of a public debate on central 
public administrations 
 
In this context, pre-accession negotiations 
were an important reason for the return to 
the  agenda  of  central  public 
administrations reform. 
 
The chronology here is important. On the 
political  and  media  scenes,  the  attention 
paid  to  the  issue  progressively  increased 
with the annual publication (after 1996) of 
the Commission’s Regular Reports on the 
Czech  Republic’s  progress  toward 
accession.  The  Reports  of  the  European 
Commission  (EC)  have  progressively 
become  one  effective  instrument  of  the 
‘internalisation’  of  the  EU,  which  had 
remained an external actor until then. The 
innovative  character  of  these  positions  – 
which were precise, informed and related 
to fields previously considered within the 
sole scope of national sovereignty – had an 
impact on the legislative agenda. Through 
its  physical  presence  from  1997,  the  EU 
became  an  integral  part  of  the  debate  in 
domestic  Czech  politics;  the  European 
Ambassador  in  Prague,  Ramiro  Ciprian, 
for  example,  have  been  regularly 
interviewed  in  order  to  clarify  certain 
points  in  the  Report.  It  is  important, 
therefore,  to  note  that  the  articles  on 
central  administrations  appeared  in  the 
press  not  only  during  the  parliamentary 
debates,  but  also,  more  significantly,  in  
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October and November, the months of the 
publication  of  the  Annual  Reports  of  the 
EC. 
 
In  1997,  the  Agenda  2000  had  already 
presented central administrations reform as 
a  fundamental  one,  in  order  to  ensure 
effective separation between the public and 
private sectors. The latter was considered 
as  an  important  precondition  for  the 
implementation of the rule of law and of a 
market  economy.  The  European 
Commission argued for the adoption of an 
‘adequate legal basis for the Civil Service’, 
the only thing able to ‘ensure the role and 
the  duties  of  the  Civil  Service’.  The 
Commission  warned  the  Czech 
government against the inaction that they 
felt was hardly justifiable: ‘since 1990, the 
successive  governments  have  not  granted 
priority  to  the  necessary  reform  and 
modernisation of the public administration. 
There has been nothing to show that this 
situation  will  change’.
17  Denouncing  the 
‘excessive  politicisation’  of 
administrations,  each  year  the  Reports 
insisted  on  the  importance  for  the  Czech 
Republic  to  ‘have  a  law  on  public 
administration’,  presented  as  ‘essential  to 
establish  the  independence,  the 
professionalism  and  the  stability’  of  the 
State  administration.
18  The  law  should 
specify  how  it  operates,  particularly  in 
order  to  limit  corruption  and  partisan 
patronage.  Each  year  the  Reports  have 
dedicated an entire column to the problem 
of  corruption  within  the  different  state 
agencies.  Within  the  framework  of 
PHARE, some programmes were devoted 
to the training of administrative staff. 
 
                                                 
17  Agenda  2000:  Avis  de  la  Commission  sur  la 
demande  d’adhésion  de  la  République  tchèque  à 
l’Union  Européenne,  Bulletin  de  l’UE,  suppl. 
14/97, p. 84. 
18 European Commission, Regular Report 2002 on 
the progress of the Czech Republic toward 
accession, B-1, COM (2002) 700 final. 
Besides  the  Regular  Reports,  the 
Commission had recourse to other means 
of  influence.  After  the  dissolution  of  the 
Office  for  Legislation  and  Public 
Administration  by  governmental  decision 
in  1996,  the  Czech  Republic  no  longer 
possessed  a  single  body  in  charge  of  the 
co-ordination  of  administrative  reform. 
Faced with this deficiency, the Delegation 
to  the  European  Commission  in  Prague 
launched  a  project  known  as  the 
‘improvement of the public administration’ 
with  the  objective  of  re-initiating  the 
programme  PHARE,  which  was  running 
out  of  steam  after  the  dissolution  of  the 
Office.  This  project  was  entrusted  to  a 
Czech  foundation,  the  Popular  Education 
Fund, created in 1994 with the support of 
the  European  Commission.  One  of  its 
objectives  was  to  draw  the  decision 
makers’ attention to the importance of the 
modernisation of central administrations at 
a  time  when,  as  the  final  report  stated, 
‘reform was reduced to the creation of de-
centralised territorial units of intermediary 
level’  and  neglected  the  central 
administrations.
19 
   
Thus, in the Czech case, the inertia of the 
national  executive  represented  an 
opportunity  that  strengthened  the  role  of 
European  actors  in  the  construction  of 
central administrations reform as a primary 
public  issue.  The  generally  legitimate 
pressure  from  the  EU  encouraged  the 
emergence of a public debate on how the 
Czech  central  state  should  function. 
Furthermore,  this  was  in  an  ideological 
context  that  tended  to  render  politically 
suspicious  the  use  of  positive  arguments 
about the State administration. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
19 Popular Education Fund, op. cit.  
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The State at issue in the political 
discourse 
 
As it began to appear in the media and on 
the  political  scene,  the  issue  of  central 
public  administrations  reform  quickly 
developed  in  the  form  of  a  pronounced 
political  cleavage  in  which  “European” 
references  were  numerous  and  used  in 
different ways. 
 
The main right-wing party, the ODS, made 
anti-statism one of the cornerstones of its 
electoral platform. The electoral discourse 
of the party emphasises that “state power” 
has  to  be  reduced  to  the  ‘five  accepted 
domains of the liberal era: foreign affairs, 
internal  affairs,  justice,  defence,  and 
finance’.  The  party  opposes  any 
“superfluous” regulation that could inhibit 
“the  entrepreneurial  spirit”  and  ‘the 
behaviour of the free market’.
20 
   
This  type  of  discourse  of  limited  state 
intervention  is  relatively  recent  in  the 
Czech  political  tradition.  The  first 
Czechoslovak  Republic  (1918-1938)  had 
developed  a  positive  discourse  about  the 
state  community  and  the  mission  of  the 
public service, which was evident from the 
importance of civic education in political 
discourse and in the educational handbooks 
of the interwar years. 
   
The  ODS  draws  on  references  from  the 
texts of the neoliberal, American economic 
trend,  rather  than  from  its  national 
history.
21 The ODS programme of 1998 is 
quite  clear  about  this  foreign  inspiration: 
the  party  presents  itself  as  a  ‘liberal-
conservative party from the right’, drawing 
its inspiration from “the liberalism and the 
classic  conservative  ideas”  in  order  to 
                                                 
20 Excerpts of the chapter, “A Cheap State”, from 
the electoral programme of the ODS, June 1998. 
21 Let us point out the importance of authors like 
Milton Friedman or Friedrich Hayek in the political 
and  intellectual  course  of  Václav  Klaus,  founder 
and first president of the ODS. 
‘create a new tradition’ for the right in the 
country. It says it always ‘knowingly’ went 
astray from the ‘traditions of the European 
centre-right,  which  was  limited  by  its 
corporative,  denominational  or  national 
definition’.
22  During  the  party  conference 
entitled ‘A free space for free citizens’ (11 
June  2000),  the  tone  was  particularly 
competitive:  ‘the  war  for  limiting  the 
power of the State, as well as that of civil 
servants, continues’. In a parallel between 
the  culture  of  bureaucracy  and  the 
European  Union,  typical  of  the  political 
discourse of the ODS, the conclusions of 
the manifestation denounced ‘the desire of 
civil  servants  to  increase  their  power’ 
which ‘is often hidden behind the words of 
the European Union’. 
   
The type of criticism levelled against the 
State by the ODS received a great deal of 
support  in  the  1990s,  which  can  be 
explained by the historical context of the 
Czech post-communist era. Administrative 
arbitrariness  evokes  the  most  familiar 
aspects of daily life during the communist 
era.  More  indirectly,  criticisms  of  a 
despotic, omnipotent State resemble those 
that  were  made  against  the  interwar 
Czechoslovak  administration,  which  was 
inherited from the imperial administration 
of  the  Habsburg  Empire.  Moreover,  the 
liberal-libertarian  foundations  that  aim  to 
increase  individual  autonomy  are  akin  to 
those  of  some  of  the  intellectuals 
associated with the underground dissidence 
of  the  1970s.  The  members  of  this 
underground  movement,  who  had  turned 
away  from  Charter  77  during  the  1980s, 
founded  some  important  newspapers  like 
the  weekly  Respekt  and  the  daily  Lidove 
Noviny.  Despite  their  differences,  these 
newspapers, along with the financial daily 
Hospodarske  Noviny,  have  significantly 
supported liberal, anti-state thought on the 
Czech political and media scenes. 
                                                 
22  Electoral  programme  of  the  ODS,  1998,  Head 
High,  “ODS:  The  Defence  of  Democracy  and 
Freedom”.  
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When the Czech Social Democratic Party 
(CSSD)
23 came to power in June 1998, it 
presented itself as a counter-model to the 
ODS.
24  It  envisions  a  positive  discourse 
concerning the State, including the welfare 
state.  Its  programme  is  inspired  by  ‘the 
humanist  philosophy  of  Tomas  Garrigue 
Masaryk’, Czechoslovakia’s first president 
(1918-1935).  The  party  denies  excessive 
devotion to the State, but it considers that 
‘the  self-regulating  mechanisms  of  the 
market, ‘the invisible hand’, alone cannot 
create a society of freedom and justice’.
25 
In  its  2002  electoral  programme,
26  the 
CSSD wanted ‘to enhance the prestige of 
the  administration’  that  is  the  citizens’ 
daily  experience  of  the  State’.  To  this 
extent,  the  party  planned  to  ‘specify 
precise professional and moral criteria that 
will  allow  equal  access  to  public 
administration  and  promote  an  ethos  of 
service to the public and respect for human 
rights’.  Additionally,  it  intended  to  grant 
tenure, raise wages and provide for social 
guarantees  –  all  proposals  to  which  the 
ODS was opposed. The party attempts to 
                                                 
23 The Czech Social Democratic Party was rebuilt 
in  December  1989  as  the  heir  of  the  “historical” 
Social  Democratic  Party,  which  was  banned  in 
1948 and survived in exile. Consequently, it is not a 
former communist party rebuilt under the guise of a 
Social Democratic Party, as was common in other 
Central  and  Eastern  European  countries.  The  old 
Czechoslovak  Communist  Party  still  exists;  its 
name is now the Communist Party of Bohemia & 
Moravia. 
24 The Social Democratic Party programmes seem 
to  provide  answers  to  the  ODS  arguments  that 
structure them in an inverse mirror-effect. The title 
of its electoral programme of June 2002, Humanity 
against  selfishness:  prosperity  for  everybody,  is 
clearly  reminiscent  of  the  ODS  programmes  of 
1992 and 1996, Freedom and Prosperity. 
25 These quotations are taken from: “Starting points 
of  the  long  term  programme  of  the  Social 
Democratic Party (opening to new expectations – 
fidelity  to  the  traditions)”,  Prague,  April  2001, 
whose  writers  are  the  deputies  S.  Gross,  Z. 
Skromach and V. Spidla. 
26  Programme  headline:  Humanity  against 
selfishness – Prosperity for everybody.  
present a positive image of the State, while 
associating  it  with  the  idea  of  a  public 
interest mission and linking its practice to 
the guarantee of constitutional civil rights. 
 
 
A polarised public debate with multiple 
historical connotations 
 
At the end of the 1990s, the one fact that 
was  unanimously  agreed  upon  was  the 
weak  performance  of  Czech  central 
administrations after 1989. As for the rest, 
there  were  highly  divergent  opinions  on 
providing solutions. 
 
Let us briefly summarise the arguments of 
the  two  sides  of  the  dispute,  which  have 
crystallised  on  the  question  of  the 
opportunity  of  a  specific  legal  basis  for 
civil servants.  
    
For the supporters of a public law status, a 
model  of  bureaucracy  with  statutory 
specificity is a guarantee of administrative 
autonomy and of the equality of all before 
the law. In other words, the law, above all, 
ensures excellence, rather than the market 
and competition. In these instances, when 
theories  inspired  by  the  ‘New  Public 
Management’  are  mentioned,  they  are 
rejected in the name of the specificities of 
the State administration, its role under the 
law, and the risk that it may lose the values 
that  are  tied  to  State  service,  such  as, 
‘professional  honour,  ethics  of  public 
service  and  incorruptibility’.
27  Whether  it 
is in the academic world or in the media, 
supporters  of  the  law  emphasise  its 
expected benefits such as the integrity and 
the de-politicisation of civil servants.
28  
 
                                                 
27 T. Cebisova, op. cit., pp. 4-5. 
28 This point of view is taken, for example, by the 
journalists  Lida  Rakusanova  and  Jiri  Krejcik  in 
With  Bureaucracy  Forever,  a  documentary 
broadcast on public television, channel one during 
primetime (CTK, 20.06.2001).  
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For the opponents of a public law status, 
the best way to attract qualified employees 
to  the  administration  is  economic  rather 
than statutory.  In short, it is advisable to 
place  the  civil  servants  in  a  competitive 
environment  where  recruitment  remains 
open; thus, professional experience in the 
private sector is sought after. Some accept 
the idea of a specific law, provided that it 
presents  only  small  deviations  from  the 
ordinary legislation. These groups estimate 
that – through the means of contesting the 
politicisation of administrations – there is a 
high  risk  of  paralysing  the  executive, 
which  in  turn  could  allow  a  new 
administrative  power,  devoid  of  popular 
legitimacy,  to  replace  the  incumbent 
government.  One  part  of  this  line  of 
argument  rests  with  the  idea  that  Czech 
administrations  have  not  yet  been 
sufficiently improved or ‘purified’ in order 
to vote for a law in their favour.
29 
 
The  daily  Lidove  Noviny  was  one  of  the 
proponents  of  an  uncompromising 
argument  on  the  issue,
30  publishing,  for 
example,  articles  by  political  analyst 
Martin Weiss.
31 His articles systematically 
make  an  association  between  the  state 
administration,  bureaucratic  arbitrariness, 
and communist ideology. In implicit terms, 
these  texts  recall  the  repulsion  that  the 
State  administration  inspired  under  the 
former  Soviet  regime.  In  an  article 
published  the  day  after  the  vote  on  the 
Public  Administration  Law,  Weiss  was 
                                                 
29 For example, the stances of the deputy (Freedom 
Union)  and  jurist  Hana  Marvanova,  “Pro  uspech 
reformy  verejne  spravy  je  nutny  zakon  o  statni 
sluzbe”, Parlamentni Zpravodaj, 5, 2000. 
30 See for example Petr Fisher, “Pan urednik, pani 
urednice”  [Mr  &  Mrs  Civil  Servant],  Lidove 
Noviny, 13.03.2002. 
31 Martin Weiss is a well known journalist in the 
Czech  Republic,  whose  articles  have  been 
published in Respekt, Cesky Denik, Mlada Fronta 
Dnes  and  Lidove  Noviny.  He  was  named 
spokesman  of  the  Czech  Republic  embassy 
delegation  to  the  UNO,  in  Washington  in  1997-
2000. 
concerned about the risk of the creation of 
an  administrative  clique;  much  more 
dangerous,  he  states,  than  the  ‘risk  of 
politicisation’, even if it is a ‘real’ one.
32 
 
The  public  debate  oscillated  between  the 
fear of the arbitrariness and clientelism of 
an  administration  controlled  by  the 
political  parties,  and  the  fear  of  the 
transformation of the administration into a 
‘caste’  which  might  limit  the  legitimate 
power of elected bodies. 
 
After an overview of the main arguments, 
we  can  notice  that  the  characteristics  of 
this  debate  bring  to  mind  the  historical 
debates  which  led  to  the  setting  up  of 
public administrations during the creation 
of modern European states.  
 
Whether they are of governmental origin, 
the  work  of  jurists,  or  of  journalists,  the 
majority of the articles and commentaries 
recall the existence of two classic models 
of  administrative  systems  in  Europe: 
‘closed’ and ‘open’, which differentiate, in 
particular, the status of civil servants and 
the  management  of  employees.  In  the 
‘closed’ (or ‘career’) model, civil servants 
benefiting  from  a  guaranteed  public  law 
status  are  generally  granted  tenure  and 
their advancement is governed by internal 
channels. In the ‘open’ (or ‘employment’) 
model, the status of civil servants is under 
common law; their posts are well-paid, but 
are  without  guaranteed  specific  career 
advancement.  In  actuality,  most  current 
administrations in Member States combine 
these two models, which as a result have 
become  less  efficient  to  describe  them. 
They  nevertheless  remain  interesting 
historical markers. In the manner of ideal 
types,  these  models  were  forged  from 
different historical realities, and reflect the 
original  divergences  in  the  conception  of 
the  State  between  EU  Member  States.  It 
                                                 
32 Martin Weiss, “Pokus zastavit cas” [An attempt 
to stop time], Lidove Noviny, 16.3.2002.  
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bears reminding that for the ideal type of 
bureaucracy  (linked to the career model), 
Max  Weber  drew  inspiration  from  the 
administration set up by the Prussian state 
in  the  19th  century.
33  In  spite  of  their 
shortcomings,  the  two  above-mentioned 
models will be used in our analysis: as the 
relevant  Czech  actors  have  used  them  as 
references, these models are indispensible 
to  understand  the  terms  of  the  debate… 
and the terms of the law. 
  
From  a  strictly  historical  point  of  view, 
Czech  actors  can  trace  back  the  legal-
rational  model  of  State  administration  to 
Czechoslovakian  national  traditions:  the 
administration of the First Republic (1918-
1938)  had  retained  the  legal  and 
organisational  principles  of  the  Austro-
Hungarian, which in turn had been inspired 
by the Prussian ones. 
 
On the other hand, it is important to note 
the  historical  coincidence  of  the  debates 
concerning state reform in the CEEC with 
theories  of  new  public  management.  The 
Czech debate appeared within the context 
of the criticism of public monopolies and 
the  ‘hypertrophy’  of  the  State.  The 
promotion of the market and the postulate 
of  the  potential  universality  of  private 
management  methods  (on  which  new 
public  management  theories  are  based), 
characterise  the  historical  context  that 
developed  during  the  collapse  of  the 
communist system – and which followed it 
both westward, as well as to the east. The 
ODS,  as  explained  above,  has  clearly 
supported  these  theories  along  with  its 
anti-state discourse, which suited the post-
soviet context. 
 
These  cross-references  allow  us  to  grasp 
the complexity and the political weight of 
the  debate  on  public  administrations,  as 
well  as  the  ambivalence  (described 
                                                 
33 For a contemporary defence of the Weberian 
inspiration, see E. Suleiman (2005). 
hereafter) in the terms of the law that was 
eventually passed in 2002. Once again, this 
complexity  shows  that  ‘democratic 
transition’ cannot be perceived as a mere 
restoration;  it  is  rather  a  period  of 
invention through hybridisation. 
 
 
II - The new central public 
administration law: a European 
legislation? 
 
Contrary to the cabinets of Václav Klaus, 
the CSSD-dominated governments
34 made 
Europeanness  and  EU  membership  their 
main  electoral  issues.  When  the  CSSD 
came to power, it gave priority to central 
public  administrations  reform.  However, 
the resistance to this reform was such that, 
once again, only pressure from the EU – 
guardian and reference point in the process 
– allowed for the development and the vote 
for a public law status for civil servants. 
 
 
A guardian confronted with reform 
blockage 
 
The  approval  of  a  public  administration 
law  was  claimed  to  be  a  priority  by  the 
social  democratic  government  of  Miloš 
Zeman,  elected  in  June  1998.  The 
programme  of  the  new  government  drew 
inspiration  from  European 
recommendations:  priority  given  to 
transparency in relationships with citizens; 
tackling  corruption;  ensuring  lasting 
central  public  administration  reform;  and 
professionalism  and  independence. 
Concerning the first two issues, the Czech 
                                                 
34 This pertains to, specifically, the Zeman (1998) 
and  the  Spidla  (2002)  governments.  In  2002, 
Spidla’s  government  benefited  from  a  narrow 
majority (101 seats out of 200) due to a coalition of 
the  Christian  Democrats  (KDU-CSL)  and  the 
Freedom  Union-Democratic  Union  (US-DEU).  In 
August  2004,  Gross  (CSSD)  was  named  prime 
minister after Spidla’s resignation, and was himself 
replaced in April 2005 by Jiri Paroubek.  
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Republic  quickly  adopted  new  legal 
instruments.
35  Conversely,  the  reform  of 
the status of government employees faced 
serious opposition. 
 
The  Zeman  government (1998-2002) was 
in a fragile political situation which did not 
enable it to force the approval of the law. 
As a minority in the Parliament,
36 it owed 
its presence to an unprecedented agreement 
signed with the  ODS, its main opponent. 
The ODS agreed not to submit a motion of 
censure against the government. In return, 
Klaus’s  party  required  to  be  consulted 
before  the  vote  of  any  important 
governmental  project.  This  situation 
allowed  the  ODS  to  permanently  slow 
down  the  agenda-setting  of  the  public 
administration law. 
 
The  intervention  of  the  European 
Commission  was  particularly  significant 
during  this  period.  Even  as  the  Czech 
government  was  tempted  to  neglect  the 
issue, the Commission played the role of 
“guardian”  in  the  process  of  placing  the 
law on the agenda by continuing to draw 
attention to the subject. 
 
Over the next few years, with the date of 
EU  accession  approaching,  the  media 
continued  to  focus  increased  attention  on 
the evaluations in the Reports, particularly 
on  the  delay  of  the  public  administration 
law. The issue was covered in the general 
political sections of the daily newspapers, 
as  this  criticism  was  seen  as  the  only 
                                                 
35  Concerning  the  defence  of  citizens’  rights,  an 
“Office of the Counsel for the Defence of Public 
Rights”  [Ombudsman]  was  created  in  1999.  The 
Counsellor relies on a new piece of legislation, the 
2001 law on “the defence of citizens vis-à-vis the 
offices and institutions of State administration”. A 
code of procedure for administrative courts and a 
law containing the resolution of certain questions in 
the matter of jurisdiction (approved in March 2002) 
were effective as of 1
st January 2003. 
36  Elected  with  32.3%  of  the  vote  and  with  74 
deputies (out of 200), the Social Democratic Party 
was unable to form a parliamentary majority. 
element  in  the  Report  liable  to  delay  the 
Czech Republic’s entry into the EU. 
 
In  2001,  the  issue  caused  a  political 
controversy. The Social Democratic Party, 
the Coalition of Four and President Havel 
made  it  clear  that  they  accepted  the 
criticism  as  motivated;  whereas  Klaus 
accused the European Commission of not 
understanding  the  Czech  situation.  Klaus 
was  blamed  for  wanting  to  keep  an 
administrative  system  based  on  partisan 
patronage  in  preparation  for  a  possible 
return to power. Some articles transformed 
this  issue  into  a  general  problem  and 
contributed to dramatise the situation. The 
publicist Jiri Pehe, former political advisor 
to  President  Havel,  published  a  text  in 
which  he  claimed  that  the  conflict 
concerning  the  public  administration  law 
was  a  ‘fundamental  conflict  about  the 
nature  of  our  democracy  and  about  the 
question of knowing whether our country 
will effectively be, in 2004, one of those 
integrated into the EU’.
37 This was a long 
way  from  the  attitude  of  general 
indifference prevailing in the 1990s. 
 
 
The uses of an influence without a model 
 
The European Union has not only directed 
attention  on  this  neglected  issue:  its 
presence (direct and indirect) in the debate 
also had the effect of legitimising a certain 
type  of  central  public  administration.  In 
their  content,  proposals  of  the  Regular 
Reports  recommended  the  adoption  of  a 
public  law  status  for  central  government 
employees, and an ‘adequate legal basis for 
the civil service’. While the usefulness of 
the  law  was  challenged  by  parts  of  the 
right  wing  and  the  main  trade  union  for 
civil  servants,  the  Commission  clearly 
ruled  in  favour  of  a  revalorisation  of  the 
administration through the law. 
                                                 
37  J.  Pehe,  “Proc  potrebujeme  zakon  o  statni 
sluzbe?” [Why do we need a public administration 
law?], Hospodarske Noviny, 19.11.2001.  
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If the EU’s power of influence over public 
administration reform is clearly noticeable 
in  the  Czech  Republic,  it  is,  indirectly, 
above all due to the manner with which it 
has been used by national actors. The latter 
had  ample  room  to  manoeuvre  under  the 
labelling  of  the  European  ‘model’.  The 
Czech sources refer to the ‘recent trends of 
European administrations’ to present their 
arguments.  While  remarking  that  the 
majority  of  European  States  have  mixed 
the two ‘career’ and ‘employment’ models 
(which do not exist in their original state), 
Czech  jurists  emphasise  the  diversity  of 
administrative  practices  in  Europe.  The 
authors frequently defend the open nature 
of  the  Czech  debate  since  ‘there  is  no 
single recipe’.
38 
 
In fact, Community actors did not establish 
a precise terminology in order to evaluate 
the progress of candidate countries towards 
an  administration  that  met  their 
expectations. In that field, the EU managed 
to  exercise  a  power  of  influence,  rather 
than  that  of  injunction,  which  was  more 
easily  accepted  since  it  gave  the 
opportunity to national actors to use it in 
various  manners.  EU  pressure  in  this 
domain  was  seen  as  important  and  was 
often prominent in the arguments in favour 
of a vote on the public administration law. 
Rather  than  being  portrayed  as 
overbearing,  this  pressure  was  used  as  a 
sort  of  ‘toolbox’,  which  allowed  for 
modifying  the  variants  according  to  the 
aspects of the law that were addressed. 
 
In a national context marked by historical 
events,  often  seen  as  unfortunate,  the 
Commission’s  intervention,  from  the 
outside, has had the effect of relaunching 
the  debate  on  the  status  of  public 
administration on the basis of historically 
different, Western European ideas that are 
                                                 
38  Taisia  Cebisova,  “Uprava  statni  sluzby  v 
soudobych  demokraciich”  [The  development  of 
state administration in contemporary democracies], 
Parlamentni Zpravodaj, 4/2001, p. 1. 
generally  considered  as  positive.  Until 
now, the main external points of reference 
were  American  or  British  (Thatcher)  and 
anti-statist in nature. Thanks to this other 
European  point  of  reference,  certain 
arguments,  which  would  have  normally 
been interpreted as archaic, have begun to 
take  on  a  new  sense  of  ‘modernity’. 
Through its insistence on a vote on a law 
and  the  de-politicising  of  public 
administrations,  the  Commission 
strengthened  the  arguments  in  the  debate 
that tended to favour the ‘return’ to civil 
servants-oriented  administrations.  Rather 
than  associating  the  choice  with  the  pre-
war Czechoslovak administration – which 
was  seen  as  too  similar  in  spirit  to  the 
Austro-Hungarian  Empire  –  the  authors 
generally  preferred  to  make  reference  to 
the European traditions of the EU, which 
allowed  for  the  modernisation  of  the 
argument  in  favour  of  a  public 
administration  law.  Intervention  from  the 
Commission allowed Czech actors to open 
up  the  debate  in  order  to  shift  the  focus 
from  the  perspectives  of  anticommunist 
and administrative ‘purification’, to readily 
making  reference  to  foreign  examples  in 
the  political  and  historical  context  of  the 
former Eastern Europe. 
   
At  the  governmental  level,  the  support 
from the EU appears to have given Czech 
officials the latitude to loosely follow the 
recommendations  of  liberal  inspiration 
proposed  by  other  international 
institutions, like the OECD. This point is 
illustrated by a comparative study of two 
preparatory  reports  of  the  law.  The  first 
report,  titled  ‘Generic  Model  for  the 
Organisation  of  Ministers  in  the  Czech 
Republic’,
39  is  the  product  of  an  expert 
appraisal published by the SIGMA agency 
within  the  framework  of  the  PHARE 
programme  (‘Strengthening  the 
administrative  and  institutional  capacities 
                                                 
39 Generický model pro organizaci ministerstev 
České republiky.  
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in  order  to  implement  the  acquis 
communautaire’). SIGMA
40 was created in 
1992  by  the  OECD  and  the  PHARE 
programme  (EU).  The  second  report, 
‘Conception  of  Modernisation  of  the 
Central  State  Administration  Considering 
the  Clerk  Status  and  Structure  of 
Administration  Authorities’,
41  is  a 
synthesis  produced  by  the  Czech 
ministerial  services  in  charge  of  the 
administrative  reform
42  that  was  elevated 
to the status of an official document for the 
reform on 20 June 2001. 
 
Between the two texts, it appears that the 
official  synthesis  report  offered  more 
possibilities. For example, both reports are 
representative  of  the  ‘current  European 
trend’  of  separating  the  functions  of 
conception and co-ordination – which are 
left  to  the  responsibility  of  ministries  – 
from  those  of  application  or  service. 
Staffan  Synnerström,  director  of  SIGMA 
and  co-ordinator  of  the  expertise  report, 
proposed  a  single  solution:  independent 
agencies. The ministerial report suggested 
three  ways  to  transfer  responsibilities:  to 
de-centralised  territorial  units;  to  de-
concentrated  administrative  units;  and  to 
agencies.  It  should  be  noted  that  the 
“necessity”  of  dividing  conception  and 
execution  was  not  questioned
43  but  a 
                                                 
40  Support  for  Improvement  in  Governance  and 
Management  in  Central  and  Eastern  European 
Countries 
41 Koncepce modernizace ustredni statni spravy se 
zvlastnim  prihlednutim  k  systemizaci  a 
organizacnimu usporadani spravnich uradu. At the 
time of the reform, these texts could be consulted 
on the official web site of the Czech Ministry of the 
Interior at http://www.mvrc.cz/reforma/moderniz. 
42  This  concerned  the  Department  for  Public 
Administration Reform within the Ministry of the 
Interior  in  collaboration  with  the  Department  of 
Public  Administration  within  the  Ministry  of 
Justice. 
43 This distinction between the tasks of conception 
and of execution  was gradually introduced in the 
UK after the 1968 Fulton Report. It appeared in the 
works of the Efficiency Unit, created by Thatcher’s 
government in 1979, and again in the Next Steps 
degree  of  leeway  is  reintroduced  in  the 
ministerial  synthesis  document.  Moreover 
the  SIGMA  report  repeatedly  mentioned 
the divergence of the options chosen by the 
government in its bill. 
 
Among  the  requirements  induced  by 
‘recent  European  trends’,  the  ministerial 
report  recommended:  strengthening  the 
means of horizontal co-ordination between 
ministers;  consolidating  the  audit  with 
external inspection; and the application of 
‘management’  methods,  which  included 
the simplification of hierarchical levels and 
objective  organisation.  These 
recommendations – with the exception of 
the latter – were included in the law. 
 
In  the  end,  the  bill  of  the  Zeman 
government was only partially inspired by 
the  principles  of  the  New  Public 
Management’. 
 
 
The new law on public administration 
(2002) 
 
The text which was finally approved
44 is a 
testimony  to  the  clash  of  doctrines  and 
interests that occurred during the process. 
The career system model that prevailed at 
the time of writing remains one of the main 
foundations  of  the  law,  but  important 
changes were introduced by parliamentary 
amendments. 
 
In its initial version, the law provided for 
the  appointment  of  civil  servants  to 
permanent  posts  after  five  years  of 
employment  and  after  passing  an 
examination.  The  recruitment  of 
                                                                       
Report  (1988),  which  proposed  the  creation  of 
independent  agencies.  This  system  was  also 
adopted  in  mainland  Europe,  especially  in  Spain, 
the  Netherlands  and  Denmark  (F.  Dreyfus,  2000, 
pp. 249-50). 
44 The law “on the service of State employees in 
administrative  bodies  and  on  the  remuneration  of 
these  and  other  employees  in  administrative 
services”, was published on 28 May 2002.  
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employees coming from the private sector 
was  not  particularly  facilitated.  Having 
anticipated  resistance  to  granting  tenure, 
the  government  introduced  a  change 
contrasting with the classic career model: 
civil servants could be dismissed after two 
negative evaluations. 
   
Several  provisions  are  inspired  by  this 
model.  First  of  all,  for  example,  the  law 
generalises  recruitment  with  open 
competitions following public advertising. 
Secondly,  candidacy  requirements  are 
sufficiently  general so  as to ensure  equal 
access to public employment. 
   
Recruitment operates according to a rather 
lengthy procedure, which enhances merit-
based selection. The process takes place in 
three  stages  of  local  open  competition. 
After  a  first  exam  before  a  collegiate 
committee, which classifies the candidates 
into  categories,  the  selected  individuals 
undergo twelve months of training in the 
recruiting department. They are then given 
a  second,  ‘administrative  exam’,  which 
includes both an oral and a written section. 
If  the  candidate  is  successful,  they  are 
entitled to civil servant status and will be 
given a post when it becomes available.  
   
An  Institute  of  State  Administration  was 
established,  responsible  for  continuous 
training  during  the  course  of  a  career. 
Furthermore, advancement was to take into 
consideration  a  combination  of  seniority 
and merit. 
   
The  status  of  civil  servants  is  extremely 
unified  compared  to  existing  practices. 
Until  now,  the  diversity  of  contracts  and 
recruitment modalities prevailed from one 
ministry  to  the  next.  Moreover,  job 
descriptions,  assignments,  and 
remunerations were also inconsistent. The 
new  law  establishes  a  standardised 
classification  of  civil  service  positions, 
with  ranks,  salary  regulations,  and 
premiums  that  are  valid  in  all  sectors.  It 
also  codifies  the  procedures  of 
remuneration and of advancement. 
   
By the legal definition of their rights and 
duties,  government  employees  now  come 
under  the  authority  of  a  specific  status. 
Civil servants must take an oath of fidelity 
to the State when they assume their post. 
They  must  comply  with  a  code  of 
discipline,
45  discretion,  fairness  and 
integrity.
46 In theory, the law forbids them 
to have other sources of income, and they 
cannot be members of other management 
or  supervisory  bodies  of  profit-making 
organisations. 
   
The  main  limitations  concern  senior 
officials,  who  are  no  longer  allowed  to 
hold any partisan position, and do not have 
the  right  to  strike.
47  In  the  event  of  a 
resignation  from  an  administrative  post, 
there is a period of two years during which 
the employee is not allowed to work in a 
position  in  the  private  sector  that  might 
relate  to  their  former  post.  Once  again, 
present among other factors in this domain 
is  the  pressure  from  the  EU  in  tackling 
corruption  and  insider  trading  within  the 
ranks of administrations. 
   
As  for  compensation,  the  status  of  State 
employees  includes  a  number  of  social 
advantages. They are entitled to five weeks 
paid  holiday,  whereas  the  legal  period  in 
                                                 
45 However, the obligation to obey is not absolute: 
if an order appears to be contrary to the law, the 
civil  servant  is  obligated  to  inform  their 
administrative  (and/or)  political  superiors,  i.e.  the 
DG or a  minister. If no action is  taken, the civil 
servant has the right to demand that the dispute be 
indicated on their personal record. 
46 A Code of Ethics for officials (adopted in 2001) 
preceded  the  law,  with  provisions  on  the 
obligations, rights and fundamental duties of civil 
servants. 
47 Civil servants can be in trade unions and elect 
counsellors  to  negotiate  the  organisation  and  the 
working conditions of the service; they can obtain 
available funds to achieve their trade union tasks. 
The  trade  unions  are  represented  within  the 
consultative bodies of the Directorate-General.  
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the  Czech  Republic  is  four  weeks. 
Moreover,  a  retirement  premium  is 
provided  to  employees  who  have  served 
for at least five years. 
 
In  this  standardisation  of  procedures,  the 
law  establishes  a  notable  innovation:  the 
position of Directorate-General (DG), with 
extended  responsibilities,  including  the 
inspection  of  departments  and  the 
harmonisation  of  staff  policies.  The 
Director-General  and  their  assistant  are 
appointed or discharged by the President of 
the  Republic  acting  on  government 
proposal.  In  accordance  with  requests 
emanating  from  the  departments,  the 
Directorate,  along  with  the  accountant 
general,  develops  a  centralised  forward 
planning of posts and remunerations. The 
final  decision  goes  to  the  government  in 
the  drafting  of  the  budget.  As  supreme 
authority of the central administrations, the 
Director-General is present in all stages of 
the control and co-ordination of remits and 
services.  The  Director-General  is  assisted 
by a Secretary-General, who is appointed 
by the DG in accordance with the needs of 
the respective ministries. 
 
These provisions tend to establish a system 
of  the  classic  career  model  and  a 
bureaucratic  and  centralised  organisation. 
Other  aspects  adhering  to  this  system 
include:  the  insistence  on  recruitment 
based  on  merit  and  professionalism;  an 
oath  of  office;  the  separation  of  the 
political  and  administrative  systems;  the 
provisions concerning the integrity of civil 
servants and their specific status; as well as 
the centralised and uniform organisation of 
departments. 
   
On the other hand, some of the provisions 
contradict  this  trend,  which  inevitably 
leads to a hybrid system, which attests to 
the  debates  and  conflicts  which  have 
affected the drafting process.  
   
The  decision  not  to  grant  tenure  to 
government  employees  is  the  most 
significant change in relation to the initial 
bill. This came into effect in 2002 after the 
submission of a parliamentary amendment. 
The  balance  of  the  parliamentary  forces 
was  against  the  Social  Democratic  Party: 
the ODS (63 deputies) and the Communist 
Party  (24  deputies)  were  against  the 
project.  Initially,  the  Coalition  of  Four 
(liberal  centrist)
48  was  not  in  favour, 
although  it  changed  its  mind  under  the 
pressure of its largest party, the Christian 
Democratic  Union  (20  deputies).  This 
party,  which  was  established  during  the 
interwar  years,  was  quickly  won  over  by 
the  idea  of  a  status  securing  the 
competence and the de-politicisation of the 
central  administrations.  Nevertheless,  the 
Coalition of Four voted the law under the 
condition of the withdrawal of the granting 
of tenure, which was deemed irresponsible, 
arbitrary  and  archaic  by  these  political 
parties,  since  it  was  considered  that  the 
civil  servant  could  not  be  subjected  to 
proper controls. 
In  the  end,  non-tenured  State  employees 
are  recruited  for  an  ‘open-ended  service’ 
(služba  na  dobu  neurčitou,  art  29-1).
49 
Civil  servants  can  be  dismissed  for 
professional  inadequacy  noted  in  a  poor 
appraisal (two consecutive negative service 
reports)  and  also  through  departmental 
reorganisation (which is, however, unusual 
in  European  public  employment).  In  this 
instance, civil servants have an interval of 
twelve  months  to  look  for  an  equivalent 
position  after  which  they  lose  their  state 
employee status. For positions lower in the 
hierarchy, the restructuring of departments 
can  result  in  an  immediate  dismissal, 
                                                 
48  The  Coalition  of  Four  included:  the  Christian 
Democratic  Union,  present  in  the  House  of 
Representatives  and  in  the  Senate;  the  Union  for 
Freedom  (the  same);  the  Civic  Alliance  (in  the 
Senate); and the Democratic Union (in the Senate). 
49 The Czech word for ‘service’ [služba] is different 
from ‘contract’ [smlouva]. Here, it refers to an 
open-ended service, different from the open-ended 
contract used in the private sector.   
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without  a  twelve-month  interval,  after  an 
advance notice of two months. 
   
Additionally,  these  amendments  have 
facilitated  the  opening  of  the  recruitment 
system  to  candidates  from  other 
administrations  or  the  private  sector. 
Candidates having worked for at least three 
years in a related field, but in the private 
sector  or  a  non-profit  organisation,  are 
exempt  from  both  the  initial  stage  in  the 
selection  process  and  from  the  training 
period, and they can proceed directly to the 
administrative  exam.  The  same 
requirements  exist  for  territorial 
administration  employees  coming  from  a 
similar  field  of  service.  Despite  its 
complexity,  the  system  of  recruitment  is 
intended to be relatively open.
50 
   
The  two  connected  problems  of 
sectorisation (the famous resortismus) and 
of  the  power  wielded  by  the  heads  of 
departments  have  not  really  been  solved. 
The  department  and  the  head  of  the 
department remain the bases of the system 
whatever  the  remits  given  to  the 
Directorate-General.  The  modalities  of 
recruitment are explicit on that point. If the 
law generalises open competition, it also, 
at the same time, confirms its ‘sectorised’ 
nature.  In  the  recruiting  committees,  the 
members  of  the  ministry,  or  even 
department,  concerned  are  the  majority. 
For  example,  the  first  exam  is  an  oral 
interview  primarily  concerning  questions 
linked  to  the  department.  Secondly,  the 
objective of the training is to prepare the 
candidate  for  working  in  a  given 
ministerial area, and the State exam at the 
end  of  training  is  organised  at  the 
ministerial  level  and  concerns  the 
capacities  of  the  candidate  in  the 
                                                 
50 This openness was restricted during the transition 
period between 1 January 2004 and 31 December 
2006, since specific provisions give priority to the 
employees with more years of seniority – especially 
the  senior  officials.  The  opening  of  the  private 
sector was not given priority during this period. 
designated  position.
51  Furthermore,  the 
appointment procedure for filling available 
posts gives priority to the employees and 
the trainees in the same sector of service. 
Officials  coming  from  other  departments 
can  only  run  as  candidates  if  there  is  a 
second call for applications. 
   
The  new  Directorate-General  is  meant  to 
make up for the ‘sectorised’ aspect of this 
recruitment. The fact remains that the spirit 
of  the  law  implies  one  specialised 
administration  per  sector.  According  to  a 
similar  system  in  Germany,  ministerial 
autonomy and the concrete preparation to 
the  available  post  prevail.
52  This  type  of 
system  favours  officials  who  are 
specialised in one sector. It discourages the 
generalised  training  of  civil  servants  and 
the inter-ministerial circulation of staff. 
   
The law safeguards discretionary power for 
the  heads  of  the  ministerial  departments. 
Although in many aspects the law protects 
civil  servants  against  the  risk  of 
arbitrariness,
53  it  also  preserves  a 
significant  degree  of  control  and  an 
instrument of pressure for the department’s 
heads  thanks  to  the  modalities  of 
recruitment  and  appraisal.  The  appraisal 
reports are prepared every trimester by the 
immediate  superior.  For  example,  the 
promotion of civil servants and their career 
are  dependent  upon  the  reports’ 
suggestions  of  continuous  training.  They 
can  also  justify  their  dismissals  for 
unsatisfactory  work.  Contrary  to  what  is 
                                                 
51  The  law  also  leaves  the  recruiting  services 
important room for manoeuvring to organise open 
competitions,  with one exception:  who  was to be 
given the authority to define the content of the open 
competitions was not specified, although it would 
most likely have been the recruiting department. 
52 The three-stage recruitment process borrows the 
principle of the double exam in conjunction  with 
ministerial  training,  even  if  it  is  considerably 
simplified and unified. 
53 It provided, for instance, the possibility to sue the 
employer  service  for  discrimination  in  ordinary 
courts.  
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said to be one of its main objectives, the 
law does not guarantee the termination of 
the  practices  of  personal  and/or  political 
preferences that currently exist. 
   
 
Conclusions 
 
The constant pressure from the European 
Commission on the Czech Republic since 
its  official  application  to  the  European 
Union  in  January  1996  played  a  crucial 
role  in  the  reform  process,  helped  to 
stimulate an important debate on the nature 
of  the  central  public  administrations,  and 
influenced  the  outcome  of  the  legislative 
process and the vote on a public law status 
for State employees. This is an example of 
the role played by an international actor in 
a  process  of  reform  that  has  traditionally 
been solely within the domain of national 
sovereignty. 
   
However, it would be wrong to deduce that 
the  public  law  status  of  civil  servants  is 
only  the  result  of  external  pressure, 
exogenous to national history. Our analysis 
reveals  the  limits  of  such  a  hypothesis, 
which often underestimates the importance 
of  the  interactions  between  international 
and  domestic  actors.  ‘National’  actors 
appeal to ‘European actors’ in many ways 
according to their interests, their frames of 
interpretation,  and  relevant  historical 
national  and  international  precedents. 
Europe  does  not  necessarily  mean 
European Union in this context, and there 
are  examples  of  some  EU  member 
countries  mobilised  against  European 
Commission  recommendations. 
Conversely,  full  comprehension  of  the 
national  context  allows  for  understanding 
the  possibly  adjusted  aspects  of  the 
European ‘model’. Such an analysis shows 
that in the specific post-Soviet context the 
EU can represent and act as an advocate of 
State  re-bureaucratisation,  while  also 
appearing  (in  the  Western  European 
Member  States)  as  an  actor  of  its  own 
liberalisation.  
In  the  Czech  case,  the  influence  of  the 
European Commission has allowed for the 
re-legitimisation of the partial return to a 
national tradition of administration in the 
bureaucratic style; whereas, previously, it 
was  associated  with  the  Soviet 
administration  because  the  differences 
between  the  bureaucratic  and  the  Soviet 
models (i.e. autonomy versus the statutory 
politicisation of civil servants) have been 
overlooked  as  certain  objective  points 
converge between the legacy of Sovietism 
and the neoliberal style of administration. 
In this context, intervention by the EU – 
far  from  being  in  line  with  the  theme  of 
‘less  State’  –  has  contrarily  favoured  the 
reaffirmation of the statutory specificity of 
public  administration.  Nevertheless, 
Parliamentary  debates  have  shown  the 
strength of liberal and neoliberal ideas in 
the Czech Republic. These ideas are found 
in  the  text  of  the  amendments,  without 
which the law would not have been passed, 
as well as in the constant opposition of the 
leading  opposition  party,  the  ODS, 
wielding  the  Sword  of  Damocles  over 
legislation. 
   
Finally, in a case where the EU intervenes 
in  a  domain  that  was  initially  excluded 
from accession negotiations (and where it 
is  moreover  unable  to  offer  an  explicit 
model  of  reform),  its  tangible  influence 
depends  on  the  possibilities  of  re-
appropriating  the  reform  models  that  it 
advocates by the political and social actors 
involved. After all, these re-appropriations 
are themselves conditioned by the internal 
dynamics of national historical contexts. 
 
Since the 2004 and 2007 enlargements, the 
problem  has  been  displaced,  but  it 
confirms the role of national actors in the 
EU’s power of influence. The current issue 
is  not  to  have  these  laws  voted,  but 
effectively applied: in the Czech Republic, 
like in other countries of Central Europe,  
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these laws, voted during the pre-accession 
process,  have  still  not  fully  come  into 
force. The political debate is thus far from 
over. Some Czech deputies from the Green 
party  and  the  Popular  party
54  have 
suggested that the vote was only meant to 
satisfy the EC, but that there was no actual 
intention of implementing the reforms. 
 
Indeed,  not  only  was  there  a  long 
scheduled  wait  from  the  start  (entry  into 
force: 1 January 2004, planned application 
after a transition period: 1 January 2007), 
the effective enforcement of the legislative 
text  kept  being  postponed.
55  The  election 
of  Václav  Klaus  as  President  in  March 
2003 and the victory, even partial, of the 
ODS  in  the  legislative  elections  of  June 
2006  are  obviously  not  unrelated  to  this 
situation. 
 
This  further  confirms  that  there  is  a 
principle  of  interaction  between 
Community pressure and internal political 
will,  governing  the  placement  of 
administrative  reforms  on  the  States’ 
agendas, be they candidates to accession or 
EU members. In lieu of an administrative 
reform fully completed following the EC’s 
pressure, there has been, since the Czech 
Republic  accessed  the  EU,  a  re-
nationalisation  of  the  agenda  and  the 
debates  which  favoured  successive 
postponements. The issue here has shifted 
and  now  concerns  the  very  relative 
capacity  of  Community  authorities  to 
sustain the pressure applied during the pre-
                                                 
54 The Green deputies and some Popular party 
deputies were the only ones to vote against 
postponing the law’s application. This issue has 
been one of their favourite political themes in the 
past few years.  
55 The law’s entry into force, initially scheduled for 
1 January 2007, was repeatedly postponed by the 
Chamber of deputies several times, for the same 
budgetary reasons that the government argued 
(enforcing the law will indeed require significant 
wage upgrade). The latest vote to date, on 8 
November 2006, postponed the entry into force to 1 
January 2009. 
accession  period  once  the  candidate 
countries have accessed the EU.  
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